

DONOR FINANCED MURDER

DUTCH TAXPAYERS FINANCE UGANDAN JUSTICE, LAW, AND ORDER SECTOR

BY ERIK VAN DER ZANDEN

“Don’t you know that the Uganda Police Force (UPF), and many other corrupt state institutions, are financed by the Dutch?” Augustine Ojobile, an Ugandan activist, asked me. It was during my internship at the Forum of Democratic Change (FDC) between January - March 2019. I did not know, and could not imagine this was indeed the case, so I started searching for evidence.

The increasingly authoritarian regime of Uganda has been able to nurture strong international donor support since President Yoweri Museveni came into power in 1986. In order to maintain his rule, he reformed the constitution, misused security forces, and killed civilians. It can be justified to call the president a dictator (Branch & Mampilly 2015).

The Uganda Police Force fall under the Justice, Law, and Order Sector (JLOS). The JLOS receives large amounts of donor support. The Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (EKN) is an essential donor, for a time even its leading donor. The budgets of the Dutch embassy showed **84.538.600 euros** of Dutch taxpayer money being sent to the JLOS sector between 2008 and 2019, a period of 11 years.

2008-2010:	25.800.000
2012-2015:	40.332.000
2016:	2.757.600
2017:	10.000.000
2019:	5.649.000
<u>Total:</u>	<u>84.538.600</u>

Ojobile seems to have been correct. Dutch taxpayers are financing corrupt institutions that murder Ugandan citizens. The Netherlands should stop financing violent oppression immediately.

Nkurunziza Alphonse - Human Rights Student Activist at JusticeNowcampaign

Many Ugandans have been killed by the regime through the security forces. It's evident with the 50+ Ugandans that were shot by security forces during the freeBobiWine protests triggered after arrest of presidential candidate, Hon. Kyagulanyi Ssentamu alias Bobi Wine. After this, Ssentaza Frank a body guard to Bobi Wine was deliberately knocked down by the military patrol truck while they were escorting injured Ashiraf Kasirye who was shot during the campaign trail of Bobi Wine. Museveni in his end of year address testified that his security forces had killed Ssenyange Zebra-former professional boxer after his home was raised at midnight in Bwaise Kawempe division. The JusticeNow campaign continues to condemn such Brutal acts against humanity and calls upon Ugandans within and in the diaspora to join this non-violent students led campaign aiming at ending Regime Brutality.

<http://jn-ug.org>

Patricia Namyalo – Human Rights Activist in Washington DC

My name is Patricia Namyalo, I have personally lost fellow comrades and associates in this struggle for democracy. Rita Nabukenya a people power supporter was ran over and killed by a police patrol car. Museveni steals every penny that goes to Uganda that is intended for financial aid, this money is channelled into NRM regime programs prolong his stay in power, keep the military loyal to the extent of killing innocent Ugandans. Museveni is quoted saying “I will crush them,” in reference to people power change seeking Ugandans and that he has done by killing Ugandans using donor aid.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-CORMVHZPro&feature=youtu.be>

The Ugandan British Citizens and Friends (UBCF) operating as Uganda Diaspora Policy Alternative (UDPA Ltd) registered number 13060452 based in the UK, works to highlight the appalling human rights abuses currently happening in Uganda.

The abuses include killing, torture, maiming, kidnapping, alleged poisoning, dissolving opponents bodies in acid, in torture chambers around the country, wanton arresting and imprisonment of the youth especially supporters of Honourable Robert Kyagulanyi commonly known as Bobi Wine. Over 100 people were killed on 18th and 19th November 2020 including innocent women and children were killed when unformed and uninformed men wantonly shot people on Kampala streets where 500 hundred Ugandans sustained wounds, many still Hospitals with over 2,000 youths arrested and imprisoned all around the country.

Since then, others like 25 year old Zebra Mando Ssenyange, an international Boxer and Trainer/coach was assassinated in broad day light in Bwaise, a Kampala suburb on 31st

December 2020. President Museveni has since come out and admitted his security men killed him. The next day his friend called Joseph Lubega or Joe Vegas, who had been kidnapped by security forces was found dead with his tooth pulled out, near Bombo army barracks near in Wakiso District. Journalists like Ashraf Mukasa, Bobi Wine photographer/Journalist are arrested on a daily basis, beaten, shot at, tear gassed or killed sometimes yet the Dutch government funds Museveni army humanitarian Law through the Legal Advisor Programme (LEGAD) for years. Ambassador Hank Jan Bakker is said to have lauded the programme on how to handle peace and security! Killings continue to take place every day.

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1. Methodology

Since the remark of Augustine Ojobile in Uganda 2019, I tried to find more information about the Dutch support to the Uganda Police Force. I read several academic works on donor support towards Africa, Uganda in particular. I interviewed Moses Atocon, an Ugandan political refugee, and spoke to multiple Ugandans in diaspora and in their homeland about the issue. Most of my research was online based, delving into multi-annual strategic country reports from the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (EKN) in Uganda between 2012 and 2019. I looked for information by studying all Facebook posts of the EKN between 2012 and 2020, and found several articles from Dutch journalists. Furthermore, I used Google searches of Dutch involvement in Uganda, studying the first 10 pages of results. I looked at budgets of the JLOS and Uganda Police, that are published in their websites. My main goal in this search was to find evidence for Dutch donor support, which was found in form of money, equipment for Uganda Police, and military trainings. Through my established network since my internship in Uganda, I am part of several WhatsApp groups of Ugandan activists, who share information, images and videos of oppression by state forces.

Throughout the document, all text in italics is copied from articles, multi-annual strategic reports, or other sources that are quoted directly.

2. International Donor Support of the Regime of Uganda

Uganda has suffered from a history of violence and oppression since its independence in 1962. Notorious dictators such as Milton Obote and his military commander Idi Amin took power through force. After a long and bloody guerrilla war in central Uganda, rebel leader Yoweri Museveni provided an inspirational alternative. In the phases under the command of the National Resistance Army (NRA) society was empowered and made vigilant, and organized in local governance structures called Resistance Councils (RC's). Promoted as an army for the people, the NRA did not assault or oppress local populations, but rather put effort in empowering them. The ideology of the movement was based on the 10-Point Programme. When the NRA/NRM under leadership of Museveni captured Kampala, he gave hope to all Ugandans with his historical speech: 'This will be fundamental change'. It was not to be. Over the years democratization in Uganda was sabotaged by its own maker: Museveni himself. Willing to discard the constitution, and use oppression against his political enemies, Museveni hold on power distanced many of his comrades in the revolutionary struggle in the bush. The first of them, Dr. Besigye, initiated the Reform Agenda, later transforming it into Forum for Democratic Change (FDC).

Donor support to an increasingly authoritarian Uganda

In the meantime, the Museveni regime became increasingly skilled in getting donor support admiration. Bill Clinton said that Museveni was a new breed of leader, that would lead Africa's

renaissance. While others became increasingly sceptical of the neoliberal policies of the World Bank, Uganda accepted it wholeheartedly, becoming a new so-called 'donor darling'. Between 1986 and 2000 a total of \$3.700.000.000 dollars were sent as donor support (Anderson & Fisher 2016).

Although a lot of spending went into increasing the defence budget of the regime, against the demands of the donors, Museveni used the rebels groups Lord Resistance Army (LRA) threat under the command of Joseph Kony as argument that defence was crucial. The failed UN peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Rwandese, combined with the 9/11 attack in 2001, resulted in a focus on stability of the international donor community. Capitalizing on this change in approach, Museveni provided to become an African proxy for the Western countries. Through its stabilizing missions in Somalia and other instable regions it ensured a steady amount of donor support, military training, and equipment.

While Uganda was establishing itself as a 'local policemen' and bastion of stability to the donor community, Museveni increasingly authoritarian rule led to demands of democratic change, voiced by Dr. Besigye. In the 2001 elections, a wave of violence was unleashed on opposition. Donors remained silent and congratulated the electoral victory of Museveni as free and fair. Meanwhile Museveni could double the defence spending between 1999 and 2004 (Anderson & Fisher 2016).

As corruption scandals of Uganda military forces and police increased surrounding donor support, the donors continued and even increased their funding. The empowered security forces ensured an entrenched semi-authoritarian rule of Museveni, while violence around elections remained largely ignored. Since 2007 the EU also became an increasingly important player in the 'peacekeeping scene' of Africa, where Uganda as lead player in AFRICOM became a main beneficiary. Between 2007 and 2013, US funded \$862 million, EU \$444 million, UK \$50 million dollars, and other donors \$786 million dollars, for a total of more than a \$2.000.000.000 dollars injection of support.

Since the 2005 re-introduction of multi-party elections, use of violence and corruption of the state has only increased in order to remain entrenched in power. Donors are clearly aware about this 'difference in policy goals' and tried to argue for changes. However, they are dependent on this 'African solution for African problems', and see no other way than to continue the support. Officials in Washington, London, Brussels have admitted to be afraid to push too hard against these governance issues, in fear for losing their local security partner. So instead, they legitimized their support to Uganda, by promoting it as the 'beacon of stability'. A clear of symptom of this dependency of international donors came when a UN report in 2012 exposed that the Ugandan regime had provided logistical and military support to the M23 rebel group in Eastern Congo. Museveni threatened to pull out of the Somali mission, and the donors remained silent about the report in further debates. This continued and unhindered support has not come through coincidence but the strategic engagement of Museveni and his ambassadors with the international community. Donors are aware that they are being used, the

massive corruption of the regime, and increased violence, but not want to abandon Museveni as it is playing such a strategic role in their stabilization policies of Africa (Anderson & Fisher 2016).

While this outside-in perspective of stability was continued, there was a completely different inside-out perspective of instability and violence. During enormous state-spending on the 2011 elections, it resulted into exponential inflation of goods such as food and fuel. Hopeless, citizens rocked a national uprising in April, called 'Walk to Work', where citizens protested all most urban spots of Uganda in demand for justice and freedom. In exchange, violence was unleashed yet again, wounding hundreds of Ugandans. In the last phase of the uprising the regime showed its true colours. The special guard under the command of Museveni's son, Muhoozi, opened fire on protestors with live rounds in a killing spree. Meanwhile, donors remained silent and international media paid little attention.

Current Uganda

More recently, with the migration crisis with the EU, Museveni has adopted yet again and now boasts to host the most refugees in Africa, even though in scandals it became clear the regime made up numbers of refugees to gain more funding. Museveni is also increasingly diversifying its donor support away from his Western donors, buying jets from Russia in 2011, increased loans from Beijing, and continued talks with Iran. North Korea has been a long-standing provider of military training and equipment to the UDFP and Uganda Police. Whatever the security concern of the international donor community, Museveni quickly offered his strategic role as African solution to African problems, while the Ugandan population continue to suffer.

While conducting fieldwork in Uganda during 2019, inside-out perspectives of youth provided a radically different perspective on the current social-political-economic situation than mainstream media often portrays (Van der Zanden 2019)

During the completion of this report between 18 and 20 November 2020, protests have broken out in Uganda. On 18 November 2020, the two main opposition candidates were arrested, Bobi Wine and Patrick Oboi Amuriat, during campaigns for the presidential election. The state responded by cracking violence. Within several days more than 40 civilians, often innocent, were murdered. Their mistake was to either demand freedom or be at the wrong place at the wrong time.

3. Justice, Law, and Order sector (JLOS)

While the military is mainly used in moments of danger, the Uganda Police is a constant oppressing force, arresting opposition and critical voices. They are part of the Justice, Law and Order (JLOS) sector, a group that was initiated in 2000 with several donors. Over the years, the Uganda Police has grown exponentially in force and budget, which was 53.2% in 2015/16.

Table 4. Budget allocation by Vote 2015/16 UGX Billions

Vote	Institutions	Wage	Non-Wage	Capital	Total	% share
007	MoJCA	4.248	52.964	32.21	89.427	7.2%
009	MIA	2.433	9.873	2.113	14.420	1.2%
101	Judiciary	26.571	76.449	6.710	109.730	8.8%
105	ULRC	4.149	5.692	0.235	10.076	0.8%
106	UHRC	5.590	7.409	0.742	13.740	1.1%
109	LDC	3.800	1.500	0.870	6.180	0.5%
119	URSB	7.057	6.658	0.000	13.715	1.1%
120	DCIC	4.106	10.537	131.675	146.317	11.8%
133	DPP	6.322	14.570	7.930	28.822	2.3%
144	UPF	216.820	269.042	176.064	661.926	53.2%
145	UPS	46.020	79.681	20.729	146.429	11.8%
148	JSC	0.780	2.384	0.269	3.433	0.3%
TOTAL		324.095	535.258	378.681	1,244.03	

Figure 1: Fourth Sector Development Plan

Since 2001 the Uganda Police has become notorious for using violence against political opposition. Especially since the re-introduction of multi-party elections in 2005, the Uganda Police has become an element of state that are besieging urban centres in Uganda, harassing political opposition, students, and activists.

The Uganda Police is also regarded as a corrupt institution. In the 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index, which measures perceived levels of public sector corruption worldwide, included Uganda in the top 4 (Transparency International 2016b). Ugandans perceived Uganda Police as the most corrupt institution of the country (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative 2006a). In early 2000s, there were 15,000 police officers, at the end of 2014, it expanded to 65,000 officers.

Human Rights Network Uganda (HURINET-U) implemented a research with financial support from the Dutch embassy towards the Ugandan Police, stating that they are widely perceived as

a partisan force renowned for their brutality, lack of respect for human rights, abuse of power, and corruption (Wagner, 2019)

The role of Museveni as ‘African Solution to African Problems’ in the peacekeeping scene has led to the increased militarization of state forces by the international community. The Dutch were involved in the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) between 2012 and 2019. Since 2012, for three trainings annually, soldiers in preparation for AMISOM were trained by Dutch military personnel. Since 2016 there has been air force training as well by a Dutch/British team.

A peculiar element from the training, financing, and supporting this partisan sector of the Ugandan regime, is that it is done by international donors, of which the Netherlands have played a crucial role.

Table 3 Statement of Donors support FY 2012-2015/16

Donor	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16
UNICEF	77,043,284	00	647,045,715	1,063,473,286
DANIDA	181,818,182	00	300,000,000	DKK7,500,000
ADC (MfDR)	00	27,820,833	6,907,689	
DGF	00	00	465,687,200	Euro 8,211,356
NETHERLAND	22,000,429,100	25,214,996,741	37,208,480	Euro 1,000,000
SWEDEN	00	11,726,141,440	00	
ADC	Euro 2,000,000	Euro 2,000,000	Euro 2000,000	Euro 2000,000
ADC- ADR		1,065,113,959		
IRELAND	33,656,178	Euro 1,000,000		

Figure 2: Fourth Sector Development Plan

4. Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (EKN)

The Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (EKN) has been active in Uganda since 1991. Before they switched to sector support, they provided budget support to the Ministry of Education. Currently, they have specialized in contributing on two major themes: Food and Nutrition Security, and Rule of Law. They started the Best Farmer Awards to promote innovation among Ugandan farmers, and use their expertise to great effect in order to help transform the Ugandan agricultural sector. In the agricultural sector, the EKN plays an important and progressive role.

However, there is also a darker side about the involvement of the EKN in Uganda, which is to consistently donor support the JLOS sector, of which the Uganda Police form a major element. In order to strategize and account for their spending, the EKN developed several multi-annual strategic reports. These informative reports include the accountability for EKN spending to the JLOS. There have been several researches about governance and corruption in Uganda as well, often financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Besides these more official accounts, the EKN Facebook page provides pictures of the Dutch cooperating with the president and other top agents within the regime. Several times pictures show how the EKN hands over materials to the Uganda Police. Collaboration with the JLOS sector is portrayed as contributing to justice and stability, instead of funding an oppressive dictatorship.



Handover of pickups and motorcycles. 4 July 2018, Facebook Page EKN.



Handover of pickups and motorcycles. 4 July 2018, Facebook Page EKN.



Handover of pickups and motorcycles. 8 July 2020, Facebook Page EKN.



On November 18 2020, security forces on a pickup, painted in silver, shot randomly into civilians standing beside a road. 18 November 2020, Facebook Page Bobi Wine. To watch the video: <https://www.facebook.com/www.bobiwine.ug/videos/119699529766757/>

4.1. 2008-2010 – Departure from General Budget Support (ABS)

In 2007, the Institute of Clingendael, funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published the research: Framework for Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis. This was not specified on Uganda, but warned embassy officials to be aware about policy intentions of corrupt regimes.

Between 2008 and 2010, 17.800.000 euros was provided to the JLOS sector, as recorded in the 'Verantwoording over Bilaterale Ontwikkelingssamenwerking' by the Algemene Rekenkamer in 2012. In this document the international donor support to Uganda between 2008-2010 was around 1.7 billion dollars, of which the contribution of the Netherlands in this period was \$83 million in 2008, \$45 in 2009, and \$36 million in 2010. In 2010, that entailed 0.75% of the total donor support of the Netherlands via the bilateral channels. Furthermore, the report described that:

Uganda is one of the six partner countries that the Dutch give sector budget support (SBS). The Dutch SBS to Uganda is since 2008 focussed on the sectors education and JLOS (justice, law, order sector). In 2008 the Netherlands provided 11 million euros to SBS (6 million education, 5 million JLOS), in 2009 14 million (6 million education, 8 million JLOS), in 2009 14 million (6 million education, 8 million JLOS) and in 2010 another 18,8 million (14 million education, 4,8 million JLOS).

Until 2008 the Netherlands gave general budget support (ABS) to Uganda. Since 2008 the Dutch ABS has been phased into SBS. The embassy expected to gain better results with SBS for a dialogue with the Ugandan government and book more results (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2012).

In 2009, the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands providing the Uganda Police, with 13 land cruiser vehicles, a lorry, 20 motorcycles, and the construction of central Police stations in five districts in Karamoja. In the press a collaboration of ambassador Jeroen Verheul and Inspector General of Police Maj. Gen. Kale Kahiyyura is mentioned (Wanyama 2009). This Kahiyyura has become notorious by the Ugandan people for its violent brutality in dealing with civil unrest (Branch & Mampilly 2017)

4.2. 2011 – Rigged Election, Walk to Work Uprising

In 2011 the EKN suspended donor support to the JLOS sector for a short amount of time, after elections. There was suspicions that the Ugandan government had used massive state funds for politicized elections. This is what was published on it by Uganda Radio Network:

The government of the Netherlands has withdrawn \$4.4 million dollars in budgetary support to the Uganda's Justice, Law and Order (JLO) sector, over what it has called the organization's failure to adequately tackle corruption. The Uganda's Justice, Law and Order (JLO) sector, was earlier scheduled to receive \$11 million from the Netherlands Government as budgetary

support. In 2010, JLOS received an instalment of \$6.6 million and was expecting to receive the remainder this year. But the bad news is that the second tranche will not be disbursed. A February 17th letter from Jeroen Verheul, the Netherlands ambassador to Uganda addressed to the secretary to the treasury, Chris Kassami, states that the decision to withdraw budgetary support to JLOS was based on the government's own assessment, especially on the mismanagement of the money meant for Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in 2007. Verheul states that the assessment concludes that the precondition on corruption has not been met for the second year in a row. The letter further states that the government of Uganda did not meet its commitments in a number of important areas, taking administrative sanctions against the responsible officials, prosecution of high level cases of corruption/misappropriation and recovery of misappropriated funds. The Netherlands Government will in the coming weeks, also review and discuss the different modalities for other areas it provides budgetary support to (URN Reporter, 2011).

However, several months later, in October 2011, 6 months after the violent crackdown of the state on its civilians during the Walk to Work uprising, the EKN resumes its donor support:

9 October 2011

KAMPALA - The Netherlands Embassy has disbursed the first instalment of its support to the Justice Law and Order Sector reform programme. This follows the signing of an arrangement between the Government of Uganda and the Netherlands Embassy in Kampala, by which the Netherlands will fund 42% of the activities and investments of the said reform programme for the financial year 2011-2012, to a maximum of UGX 20 bln. The programme focuses on improving access to justice for all and enhancing respect for human rights across JLOS institutions.

Ambassador Jeroen Verheul welcomed the progress made in the Justice Law and Order Sector in the last year and indicated that this progress justifies continued support by the Netherlands to the sector. Physical access to justice has greatly improved, and the average time prisoners spend on remand has been reduced significantly. He noted, however, that concerns remain over accountability and limited progress in tackling corruption. "That is why the current work plan is focusing on strengthening disciplinary and inspection commissions in institutions", Mr Verheul said.

Whereas in previous years, the Netherlands provided sector budget support, Uganda no longer qualifies for this modality. "On top of governance concerns that have to do with a lack of accountability, we have seen a significantly weaker performance in the areas of macroeconomic and budget management in the last fiscal year", adds Mr Verheul. "The government and parliament in the Netherlands are assessing countries that receive budget support more critically on issues of political and financial governance and want to be assured that Dutch tax payers' money is spent impeccably. This is why the Netherlands has decided to move away from the sector budget support modality for Uganda, as basic conditions for that type of support are not here anymore", he explains.

Under the new agreement, the Dutch funds can only be used for the JLOS reform programme, and not for the general JLOS budget that covers wages and other recurrent costs. This will enable the Dutch Embassy to monitor the spending more closely. The Netherlands is a long standing partner of the JLOS, and is currently chairing the JLOS Donor Partners Group which regularly meets to coordinate support and to discuss progress in the sector.

4.3. 2012-2015 – Increased support to JLOS

These statements show that Netherlands is aware about the corruption of the Dutch taxpayer money by the JLOS sector.

There is a risk that this corruption has been used for ill-conceived actions of state oppression by for example the Uganda Police. This awareness about the corruption is communicated in the Multi-Annual report of 2012 – 2015.

Value for money and accountability

Leakage, waste, inefficiencies and corruption continue to impinge on the production of public goods and services. The result based approach for budget support developed in the Joint Budget Support Framework (JBSF) has proven to be a good mechanism to revitalise the communication and dialogue between Government and donors on results and actions needed in order to achieve these. However, progress has been limited to date.

A joint and graduated response to corruption on the part of donors has contributed to effective joint analysis and positioning with regard to specific cases like the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM). This has led to the imposition of sanctions by some donors including the Netherlands (cut of EUR 3.2 million in the Sector Budget Support (SBS) for JLOS for FY 2010/2011).

Figure 3: Screenshot Multi-Annual Report 2012-2015

Besides the corruption, the EKN also realised that the JLOS sector, especially the Uganda Police Force, were being politicised.

JLOS

Working in JLOS over the past years has shown a need to distinguish between the technical and the political level, but also between longer term goals and short term achievements. Whereas an overlap of interest between Uganda and the Netherlands continues to exist at the technical level, at the political level a divergence of interests has emerged in recent years as a result of the governance situation. For example, some JLOS institutions, such as the police, are increasingly being politicised.

This distinction is also demonstrated by good and constructive dialogue between donors and the Government of Uganda (GoU) on a technical level where there is an increased willingness to discuss the 'difficult' issues of accountability, professionalism, performance based management, etc. The political dialogue in this area has proven to be less fruitful. However, recent experience with informal political dialogue in a non-confrontational setting shows more potential for obtaining results.

EKN has learnt that improving professionalism and accountability, especially of the police, is a long-winded matter and that it is difficult to demonstrate results in the short term. Yet, the Judiciary on several occasions has demonstrated its impartiality and professionalism. This strengthens the assumption underlying the previous MASP that investing in professionalism in the long term contributes to better governance and enhances capacity to achieve development results.

Next to this significant lesson learnt, examples of results on a technical level in JLOS can be listed: reduction of the case backlog, reduction of people in prison on remand, improvement of the human rights situation in prisons, independence of judiciary upheld in many instances, enhanced access to justice for the poor and vulnerable by decentralizing JLOS institutions, especially to districts in the north, and establishing District Chainlinked Committees in which JLOS institutions at the district level are represented. In addition, important laws such as the Female Genital Mutilation Act, the Domestic Violence Act and some important legal reforms in the area of commercial justice have been prioritised. Support to Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the field of human rights has proven to be very useful as countervailing measures to develop alternative centres of influence, though weak capacity of CSOs remains a challenge.

Though JLOS has prioritised land justice, in reality results have not met expectations. Land issues are the root cause of many civil disputes and criminality (trespassing, murder) and hamper access to economic resources and livelihoods. However, due to the complexity of land tenure and the Government institutions involved, JLOS has not managed to make significant progress on the issue.

Abovementioned lessons will be taken into account when formulating EKN's future interventions in the area of security and rule of law.

Figure 4: Screenshot Multi-Annual Report 2012-2015

However, they continued to provide the JLOS sector with 40,332,000 euros nonetheless.

CHAPTER 6 FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

Financial ODA implications 2012-2015 in € (Policy area, budget-code, description)

1.2 Human rights	275,000
2.5 Security, good governance and rule of law	40,332,000
4.1 Food security	46,500,000
4.2 Effectiveness policy on poverty reduction	200,000
4.3 Private sector development	2,600,000
5.1 Education and research	8,000,000
5.3 Equal rights and opportunities for women	199,000
total budget 2012-2015	98,106,000

Figure 5: Screenshot Multi-Annual Report 2012-2015

4.4. 2016 – Anti-gay law and 2016 rigged elections

During 2014 protests erupted in the Netherlands, when an anti-gay bill was passed by the JLOS sector. This led to the suspension of donor support, but the support was quickly resumed afterwards. An article by Arne Doornebal 2 years later, in 2016, illustrates the ‘cordial’ relationship. In the article Doornebal interviewed Mirjam Blaak, a Dutch-born but Ugandan ambassador for the EU and Benelux in Brussels, and former ambassador Hennekens. The article is in Dutch.

Nederlands-Oegandese betrekkingen kunnen wel tegen een stootje

ACHTERGROND – Wie twee jaar geleden de Nederlandse berichtgeving over Oeganda volgde, zou denken dat Nederland een moeizame relatie heeft met het als homofoob weggezette Afrikaanse land. Echter niets is minder waar. De Nederlands-Oegandese band is al decennialang onverwoestbaar. Die overleefde zelfs de snel weer terzijde geschoven anti-homo wetgeving waarmee Oeganda in 2014 internationale headlines scoorde.

Nederland en Oeganda kunnen het uitstekend vinden samen. “Er is een brede zakelijke relatie,” zo omschrijft de Nederlandse ambassadeur Alphons Hennekens het. “Nederland is hier bezig aan een transitie van hulp naar handel. We zetten in op voedselzekerheid en de Justice, Law en Order sector. Daar is Nederland zelfs toonaangevend.”

Ook vanuit Oegandese kant wordt de band als ‘warm’ beschreven. “Cordial,” zo noemt Mirjam Blaak het. Daarbij heeft ze zelf een bijzondere rol gespeeld. Blaak werkte in de jaren ’80 in Kenia en ontmoette daar een aantal belangrijke strijders van Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA), waaronder de huidige premier Rugunda en presidentskandidaat Amama Mbabazi. Later verhuisde ze naar Oeganda en trouwde ze met Ronald Batta, die als arts diende in Museveni’s NRA. Na de machtsovername in 1986 begon Blaak met het bevorderen van handel tussen Nederland en Oeganda. Nu is ze geen Nederlandse meer maar Oegandese, en is ze ambassadeur voor Oeganda in de Benelux. “Ik denk dat Nederland in Oeganda in de top-5 staat van diplomatiek belangrijke landen,” stelt Blaak. Onbetwiste nummer 1 zijn de Verenigde Staten, waar met name het leger nauwe banden mee heeft in de strijd tegen terreur en Joseph Kony.

Oeganda ontvangt al sinds het eind van de jaren ’80, dus vlak na het aantreden van Museveni, Nederlandse ontwikkelingshulp. “In die tijd kwamen een aantal leiders aan de macht die met afwijkende ontwikkelingsmodellen voor hun land kwamen dan voorheen gebruikelijk was,” legt de Nederlandse ambassadeur Hennekens uit. “Mannen als Meles Zenawi (Ethiopië), Paul Kagame (Rwanda) en Museveni. Dit sprak de donoren erg aan.” Terwijl het aantal landen dat Nederland steunt de afgelopen jaren behoorlijk is afgenomen (van enige tientallen tot de huidige 15) slaagde Oeganda er altijd in om op de lijst te blijven staan. Hennekens herkent het beeld van Oeganda als donor darling: “De keuze voor ‘darlings’ is niet altijd een rationele keuze die gebaseerd is op mate van armoede en behoefte aan ondersteuning maar veeleer een politieke keuze.”

Een periode van spanning

Een periode van spanning in de relatie tussen Nederland en Oeganda was rondom de verkiezingen van 2006. Vlak daarvoor had Museveni de grondwet gewijzigd om de limiet van maximaal twee regeertermijnen te schrappen, waardoor hij toch nogmaals mee kon doen. In 2005, 2006 en 2007 hield Nederland telkens zes miljoen euro aan eerder beloofde budgetsteun in. Niet alleen vanwege de termijnen maar ook uit protest tegen de arrestatie en intimidatie van oppositieleider Kizza Besigye – die net als tijdens de afgelopen drie stemronden ook dit jaar weer de belangrijkste tegenkandidaat is. Den Haag tilde in die periode dus zwaar aan het afschaffen van de regeerlimiet. Maar inmiddels wordt daar heel anders over gedacht. Hennekens: “President Museveni is nog steeds, met name in de rurale gebieden, zeer populair. Het zou vrij aanmatigend zijn van Nederland om dwingend te bepalen hoelang een (populair) politicus aan de macht mag blijven.” Nederland is het afgelopen decennium steeds minder kritisch op Oeganda geworden, menen insiders. Terwijl Oeganda in 2006 op de hulp gekort werd vanwege de intimidatie van Besigye, bleven de donoren opvallend stil toen in 2009 tijdens drie dagen van straatprotesten tenminste veertig burgers om het leven kwamen, grotendeels door toedoen van leger en (militaire) politie. En ook in 2011, toen Besigye tientallen keren werd gearresteerd tijdens zijn maandenlange ‘Walk to work’ protestcampagne, leidde dit niet tot een vermindering van (Nederlandse) ontwikkelingshulp. Ook al raakte hij tijdens een arrestatie bijna blind doordat van dichtbij pepperspray in zijn gezicht werd gespoten en kreeg hij tijdens een andere arrestatie een rubberkogel tegen zijn hand.

Ophef om anti-homowet

Toch komt de Nederlands-Oegandese relatie de afgelopen tijd flink onder druk te staan, maar dat heeft niets te maken met het dwarszitten van oppositie. In 2010 begint in Oeganda een felle binnenlandse campagne tegen homoseksualiteit, onder luide toejuiching van Christelijk-rechts in de Verenigde Staten. Het tot dan toe onbekende parlementslid David Bahati schrijft een wetsvoorstel waarin de doodstraf voor homo’s wordt voorgesteld. Jaren van gesteggel tussen donoren en Oeganda volgen totdat in februari 2014 het Oegandese parlement plotseling deze wet in afgezwakte vorm in stemming brengt: een meerderheid van de aanwezige parlementsliden omarmt het plan om homo’s een levenslange celstraf te geven. Nederland is woest en reageert met een statement dat er stevig uit ziet: een deel van de ontwikkelingshulp aan Oeganda wordt per direct ‘opgeschort’. “Het ondertekenen van de wet was inderdaad voor Nederland en een aantal andere landen aanleiding om hulp op te schorten omdat deze wet discrimineert op seksuele geaardheid en oriëntatie. Ik heb in die periode regelmatig overleg gevoerd met de Oegandese regering en ons standpunt toegelicht en dat werd aan Oegandese zijde gewaardeerd. Ook was er begrip voor ons standpunt en ons besluit,” blikt Hennekens terug. “Eigenlijk wilde Nederland helemaal geen hulp intrekken maar omdat er in Nederland zoveel protest tegen Oeganda was, moesten ze met een statement komen,” zegt echter een goed ingevoerde Haagse bron. “Dat opschorten van die hulp had niks met Oeganda te maken maar was simpelweg binnenlandse politiek.”

Bizar snel

Direct na het aannemen van de anti-homowet ging een coalitie van mensenrechtenorganisaties naar de rechter. Hun advocaat, zelf oprichter van het Forum voor de Promotie van

Mensenrechten, is Adrian Jjuuko. “Die zaak ging bizar snel,” blik Jjuuko vanuit Kampala terug. “We wilden de wet ongrondwettelijk laten verklaren omdat tijdens de stemming veel te weinig parlementsleden aanwezig waren. Binnen drie maanden oordeelde het Constitutioneel Hof dat we gelijk hadden en was de anti-homowet van tafel.” Een paar dagen later vloog Museveni naar Amerika. Jjuuko, lachend: “Dat was wel een verdachte timing. Hij wilde zelf ook van die wet af, maar het hof verschaftte hem een uitweg. In Amerika was het weer business as usual, de wet was van tafel en het probleem dus ook.” De Oegandese ambassadeur Mirjam Blaak: “Ik heb toen alle donoren voorgehouden: die wet is doorgestreept, dus het opschorten van hulp is helemaal niet meer nodig.” Binnen een paar maanden is de hulprelatie met Nederland, maar ook met andere donoren, weer hersteld. Te snel, meent Jjuuko. “Toch best wel gek. Voordat de wet werd aangenomen was 95% van de Oegandezen fel tegen homo’s en hadden ze een beroerd leven. Nadat de wet was aangenomen en weer van tafel geveegd, was daarin natuurlijk niks veranderd. Maar voor het Westen was het genoeg om Oeganda weer in de armen te sluiten.” Jjuuko zet zich nog steeds in voor betere gezondheidszorg voor de LGBT-gemeenschap, die nog altijd moet vrezen voor uitstoting, ontslag of erger wanneer het geheim uit komt. De meesten zijn wijselijk in de kast blijven zitten.

Strategische partnerschappen

Sinds een aantal jaar wordt aan Oeganda geen budgetsteun meer gegeven. Dat was geld dat rechtstreeks in de Oegandese staatskas verdween en was een vrij omstreden vorm van hulp. Volgens Mirjam Blaak mist Oeganda die budgetsteun niet. “Als land wil je ook eigenlijk liever geen hulp bij het rondkrijgen van je staatsbegroting. Je bent pas echt onafhankelijk wanneer je je eigen broek op kan houden. In de jaren '80 kwam wel driekwart van het Oegandese budget uit hulp, inmiddels is dat nog minder dan 20%. We streven ernaar dit naar nul terug te brengen.” Toch is de geldstroom richting Oeganda nog altijd aanzienlijk. Het gaat om 20 miljoen euro per jaar via de ambassade, met daar bovenop nog eens 40 miljoen euro per jaar in door het ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken gesloten contracten. Het gaat hierbij onder meer om zogenaamde ‘strategische partnerschappen.’ Deze partnerschappen worden steeds belangrijker voor Nederland. Hieronder valt het gezamenlijke programma van het Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) en European Parliamentarians with Africa (AWEPA), dat zich richt op het creëren van goede voorwaarden voor beleidsbeïnvloeding. Binnen dit programma werkt NIMD samen met alle parlementaire politieke partijen in de vorm van capaciteitsopbouw en het faciliteren van een interpartij dialoog rond maatschappelijk relevante thema’s en ondersteunt AWEPA parlementaire staff en comités. “Na de verkiezingen gaat AWEPA samenwerken met de nieuwe parlementsleden,” zegt Johan van Hecke, een Vlaamse oud-Europarlementariër en regio-coördinator van AWEPA. “Een stukje training. Maar dan niet met het opgeven vingertje vanuit Europa maar vooral door hen in contact te brengen met ervaren parlementariërs elders in Afrika.” Veel van deze partnerschappen zijn gericht op beleidsbeïnvloeding.

Mensenrechtenadvocaat Adrian Jjuuko kan hierover mee praten, zijn organisatie wordt sinds jaar en dag ondersteund door het Nederlandse Hivos. “Toch denk ik dat je niet zonder de overheid kan,” stelt Jjuuko. “Zij leveren de diensten aan burgers, wij als maatschappelijk middenveld volgend dat kritisch. Je moet dus niet alle hulp van overheid naar de NGO’s overhevelen.” Een ander risico ondervond Jjuuko aan den lijve. “Met veel steun van buiten wordt je sneller gezien als opponent. Niet voor niets probeert een land als Ethiopië NGO’s flink aan

banden te leggen. Ook Oeganda werkt aan een strenge ‘NGO-wet’ die allerlei restricties oplegt. We moeten oppassen dat we geen doelwit worden.” Ambassadeur Hennekens verwacht geen grote problemen met deze partnerschappen, door critici omschreven als het ‘organiseren van tegenspraak’ in Oeganda. “Samenspraak en tegenspraak zijn uiteindelijk ingrediënten voor een gezond en levendig maatschappelijk middenveld. Daar is niets mis mee. Het gaat niet om het voeren van politieke oppositie maar veeleer om het versterken van goed geïnformeerde lobby om aandacht te vragen voor specifieke zaken.” Tevens denkt hij niet dat hij op eieren hoeft te lopen. “Ik maak me echt geen zorgen om mijn positie. We hebben een goede verhouding met zowel de regering alsook met maatschappelijke organisaties en de ambassade bevordert juist een constructieve en kritische dialoog.” Niemand verwacht grote veranderingen in de Oegandees-Nederlandse relatie na de verkiezingen. Ook niet als Museveni verliest. “Dan zal hij gewoon de macht overdragen, dat zegt hij en dat geloof ik,” aldus Van Hecke, die nauwe banden onderhoudt met zowel Museveni als met Mbabazi. “Dit wordt gegarandeerd Museveni’s laatste termijn. Zijn belangrijke bondgenoot Sam Kutesa (minister van defensie en aangetrouwde familie van Yoweri) heeft dat dit weekend duidelijk gemaakt. Die hele generatie wil nog vijf jaar door en zal het dan voor gezien houden.”


Van Hecke was wrong, as Museveni has once again changed the constitution and is competing for another term. As we can see in the 2016 Dutch Development Results, the EKN has resumed its donor support to the JLOS sector, with another 2.757.600 million euros. Again, the results of the donor support to the JLOS sector proved disappointing.

Financial summary

Total expenditure Embassy **€ 15,317,896**

Expenditure 2016 per theme

■ Food & Nutrition Security 82% ■ Security & Rule of Law 18%



Expenditure 2016 per channel

■ NGO 54% ■ Government 18%
■ Research institutes and companies 28%




Figure 6: Screenshot Multi-Annual Report 2016

The year 2016 was marked by a slowdown in economic growth and a decrease in political space, but a louder voice from civil society and the media. The presidential elections and their aftermath were accompanied by irregularities, occasional brutalities by the security forces and shrinking political space. Economic growth was lower than expected and investments in the public social sectors (health, education) were insufficient to meet the demands of a fast-growing population. On the other hand, civil society, the private sector and the media have been increasingly active in engaging in policy debates with the government.

The influx of around one million refugees is an enormous challenge for Uganda, which has one of the biggest refugee populations in Africa. In spite of these challenges and constraints, the programmes supported by the Netherlands were able to maintain their efforts to increase production and income for smallholder farmers and improve access to justice. Furthermore, trade and investment initiatives between Uganda and the Netherlands remained robust (Dutch Development Results 2016).

The expected results in the Justice, Law, and Order Sector were scaled down due to budgetary limitations, as a result of significantly reduced (Dutch) donor funding. Strong leadership from the Chief Justice is shaking up the judiciary, resulting in case backlog reduction; broad public appreciation and gradual restoration of the sectors credibility and reputation. Some key (interrelated) problem areas within the sector are being addressed more vigorously than before (e.g. corruption, case backlog, juvenile justice, and gender-based violence).

Continuing support to the Justice, Law, and Order Sector will focus on the reduction of case backlog, transitional justice, and safety/security in the refugee settlements in Northern Uganda. Likewise, the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF) will continue to be the main instrument for enhancing constructive engagement between civil society and the government. It is the intention to invest further in SRHR as one of the priorities in the new country strategy (Dutch Development Results 2016).

2019-2022 – Increasing donor support JLOS

Three years later, the description of the Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS) in the Sector Development Plan (SDP) is rebranded. The Dutch report claims that: *the priority is on empowering people by building trust and upholding rights. The SDP is funded by the Ugandan government and various donors, including the Netherlands. A five-year arrangement with the government of Uganda was signed late in 2017 to provide a grand of 10 million euros. In 2019, this contribution was increased by 7 million euro because, despite the good results achieved by the SDP, the budget turned out to be inadequate to achieve all the planned results.*

Here another 17.000.000e euros of Dutch taxpayer money is provided to the JLOS.

Main challenges

- *In spite of all efforts, corruption remains a challenge and one that the sector has not yet been able to effectively combat.*
- *There are still serious incidents of brutalities and human rights violations happening the sector.*
- *In general, room for opposition parties and NGOs to express themselves is expected to shrink with the elections coming up in early 2021. This will pose a threat to the results that have been achieved so far but it also shows the importance of continued dialogue with the sector.*

21% of 26.900.000 translates into another 5.649.000 euros for the JLOS sector in the 2019 budget (Dutch Development Results – Uganda).

The Netherlands has supported Uganda in making progress in improving the Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS). This sector includes the judiciary, the police and prisons. An important result was the approval of the transitional justice policy by parliament, considering its relevance to many people in Uganda. Challenges remain, however, such as ensuring the accountability and credibility of justice institutions, including the judiciary and the police. A dual approach is applied, supporting the JLOS government institutions and, at the same time, supporting civil society efforts to deal with justice and legal affairs. The focus is on increasing rights awareness and access to justice, and supporting institutional and legal reform.

Security of Ugandans enhanced.

Security agencies are more and more under public pressure due to scandals of corruption, involvement in criminal activities, brutality, human rights violations and lack of accountability. Both JLOS and DGF are addressing performance of the security forces as one of their intervention areas. A pilot is ongoing to get more objective and systematic feedback from citizens of the rate of satisfaction of the services received at police stations. These and similar pilots will be expanded to get a more reliable information base of the performance of security agencies in the different parts of the country

Capacity of UPDF to participate in peace security missions in the regions enhanced.

A safe and stable Uganda which respects the rule of law is a prerequisite for democratic governance and inclusive development. It also positions Uganda as a credible player to enhance regional security and stability (Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes). The support provided to the UPDF through the Dutch Ministry of Defence in partnership with the US, France and the UK has proven to be effective and will be continued at least until 2020. Uganda's ongoing deployments to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), its previous participation in missions to counter the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), and its intervention in the South Sudanese crisis have demonstrated willingness and capacity to deploy armed forces to enhance regional peace and security albeit sometimes to the detriment of Uganda's international reputation (invasion in the Democratic Republic of Congo). The relevance of this commitment for the coming years is

beyond any doubt, given the nature, scope and the background of the different conflicts (The Netherlands in Uganda 2019).

As in earlier Multi-Annual Strategic Reports, the EKN is aware about the shrinking space for opposition, corruption, and risks for instability. Nevertheless, they continue to support the JLOS with donor support. Furthermore, it collaborates with the military forces of Uganda.

Increasing Levels of Instability

Corruption, patronage and repression are increasingly being used by the ruling party to remain in power. Rising crime rates have come to dominate the local narrative, as murders, robberies, and kidnapping have raised alarm among citizens and elites alike. Uganda’s young population creates an expanding dependency burden at the household level, with a related increase in demand for social services, which is not keeping pace with the growth. Currently, at least 64% of young people have no formal employment. The exclusion and frustration of the youth risks to further undermine social cohesion and stability. Uganda’s neighbouring countries with active conflicts form another potential risk, since this could cause an even higher influx of refugees and fuel growing tensions between host communities and refugees when resources become scarcer.

Expenditure Embassy by theme

Metric




Figure 7: Screenshot 2019 budget of EKN

Corruption

Corruption is widespread in Uganda and seen as one of the greatest obstacles for the country's economic development as well as the provision of quality public services. Corruption undermines the delivery of services, reduces incentives for international investment, and constrains poverty reduction and economic growth. Uganda has a decent legal and institutional framework for addressing corruption, but implementation lags behind. To mitigate risks, due diligence is and will be carried out during the assessment of new activities, funds are carefully advanced and staff and partner organisations are made aware of the risks. The Netherlands is active in several working groups on corruption.

Expenditure Embassy by channel

Metric




Figure 8: Screenshot 2019 budget of EKN

The Shifting Space for Civil Society Over the years

CSO's dealing with human rights and governance issues, the media and human rights defenders, have been met with restrictive (interpretation of) laws by government. This places development partners in a difficult position. On the one hand, government accuses Western donors of funding the opposition through CSO's, on the other hand some CSO's think development partners are not doing enough to support them and should stop working with the government altogether. The Netherlands will continue to call for the strict observance of human rights and the protection of citizens, together with the EU and other development partners. The Netherlands will also continue to discuss the way forward with CSO's and other stakeholders. The Netherlands is supporting initiatives for increased cooperation between civil society and government institutions and deepening the ownership of their work by the communities, CSO's serve. The Netherlands will capitalize on its extensive network of local partners through the strategic partnerships, the DGF and the JLOS to inform its policy and political dialogue with the Government of Uganda (The Netherlands in Uganda 2019).

It is clear that the EKN has been aware about the risks of corruption while sending Dutch taxpayer money to the JLOS sector. What they seemingly hoped for, was to establish a form of control over the developments of this sector, with the assumption that they work together with another government. Instead, when informed by the inside-out perspectives among the Ugandan people in opposition, the Dutch are financing an oppressive and corrupt military regime.

Based on the JLOS website we can see that its budget is rising quickly. From 1,119.66 in 2017/18 to 1,468.95 in 2020/21.

5.2.1 Financing Sources for the SDPIV

Table 11. SDPIV financing sources

Funding	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21	Total
1. GOU/BUDGET SUPPORT DONORS					
Wage	375.20	393.97	413.66	434.35	1,617.18
Non-wage recurrent	525.73	630.88	693.97	798.06	2,648.64
Development	218.73	253.84	197.11	236.54	906.22
Total GOU/Budget Support Funding	1,119.66	1,278.69	1,304.75	1,468.95	5,172.05
2. OTHER ANTICIPATED FUNDING					
Expectation from Development Partners	27.00	31.70	71.00	65.00	194.70
Funding from the private sector under PPP	-	114.30	114.00	114.00	342.30
TOTAL FUNDING	1,146.66	1,424.69	1,489.75	1,647.95	5,709.05

Figure 9: Fourth Sector Development Plan

The largest beneficiary of that increase is the Uganda Police, including LDU's. Local Defence Units (LDU's) are armed militias, often deployed outside their areas of origin, and notorious for brute force against civilians. The deputy commander of these LDU's Col. Felix Abachu said: "We shall take your life. That's the order, people should know that. We've started. You've heard and you've seen on TV. For us we shoot to kill. We aren't breaking people's legs. We shoot to kill," (Kiggundu, URN 2020).

We can see the budget rise for wages starting from 234.24 to 273.46, a difference of 39.22. In no other component see we such a rise of allocated budget. In fact, the total rise is from 375.21 to 434.34, a difference of 59.13. Around 67% of the total increase goes towards the Uganda Police and LDU's.

5.2.2.1. Breakdown of the MTEF Provision by Component Expenditures by Vote

Table 13. Wage

MDA/ VOTE NAME	FINANCIAL MTEF CEILING (UGX, BILLION)			
	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21
Justice, Attorney General including SWAP Dev	3.72	3.90	4.10	4.30
Internal Affairs(Excl. Auxiliary forces)	1.95	2.05	2.15	2.26
Judiciary (Statutory)	30.63	32.16	33.77	35.46
Law Reform Commission (Statutory)	4.07	4.28	4.49	4.72
Uganda Human Rights Commission (Statutory)	5.59	5.87	6.16	6.47
Law Development Centre	3.80	3.99	4.19	4.40
Uganda Registration Services Bureau	7.55	7.93	8.32	8.74
National Citizenship and Immigration Control Board	4.38	4.60	4.83	5.07
DPP	7.35	7.72	8.10	8.51
Uganda Police (incl LDUs)	236.24	248.05	260.45	273.47
Uganda Prisons	52.19	54.80	57.54	60.42
Judicial Service Commission	1.90	2.00	2.10	2.20
Directorate of Government Analytical Laboratory	0.76	0.80	0.84	0.88
National Identification and Registration Authority	15.06	15.82	16.61	17.44
	375.21	393.96	413.67	434.34

Figure 10: Fourth Sector Development Plan

We can also see a steep rise in the budget for non-wage recurrent. Non-wage recurrent for Uganda Police and LDU's can be bullets, tear gas, and other tools to oppress the Ugandan population. Even if the donor support of the Netherlands does not go directly to the Uganda Police or LDU's, it enables the Ugandan government to spend millions on non-wage recurrent.

Table 14. Non-Wage Recurrent

MDA/ VOTE NAME	FINANCIAL MTEF CEILING (UGX, BILLION)			
	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21
Justice, Attorney General including SWAP Dev	46.34	55.61	61.17	70.34
Internal Affairs(Excl. Auxiliary forces)	13.98	16.78	18.46	21.23
Judiciary (Statutory)	97.51	117.01	128.71	148.02
Law Reform Commission (Statutory)	6.00	7.20	7.93	9.11
Uganda Human Rights Commission (Statutory)	12.10	14.52	15.98	18.37
Law Development Centre	2.15	2.58	2.84	3.27
Uganda Registration Services Bureau	5.89	7.07	7.78	8.94
National Citizenship and Immigration Control Board	17.74	21.29	23.42	26.93
DPP	18.36	22.03	24.24	27.87
Uganda Police (incl LDUs)	186.93	224.31	246.74	283.75
Uganda Prisons	67.53	81.04	89.14	102.52
Judicial Service Commission	6.42	7.70	8.47	9.74
Directorate of Government Analytical Laboratory	2.94	3.53	3.89	4.47
National Identification and Registration Authority	41.82	50.19	55.20	63.49
	525.73	630.88	693.97	798.06

Figure 11: Fourth Sector Development Plan

In this table can we see the amount of expected funds from development partners. However, this is deceiving, as the total Government of Uganda (GOU) funding is reinforced by Budget Support Funding. It is unclear if the Dutch donor support is perceived as JLOS budget support funding, or development partner funding.

Table 15. GOU Capital Development

MDA/ VOTE NAME	FINANCIAL MTEF CEILING (UGX, BILLION)			
	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21
Justice, Attorney General including SWAP Dev	30.92	40.19	48.23	57.87
Internal Affairs(Excl. Auxiliary forces)	1.26	1.64	1.96	2.36
Judiciary (Statutory)	4.07	5.29	6.35	7.62
Law Reform Commission (Statutory)	0.20	0.26	0.31	0.37
Uganda Human Rights Commission (Statutory)	0.41	0.54	0.64	0.77
Law Development Centre	0.87	1.14	1.36	1.63
Uganda Registration Services Bureau	-	-	-	-
National Citizenship and Immigration Control Board	8.81	11.46	13.75	16.50
DPP	6.46	8.39	10.07	12.08
Uganda Police (incl LDUs)	101.66	101.66	14.50	17.40
Uganda Prisons	31.14	40.48	48.58	58.29
Judicial Service Commission	0.24	0.31	0.37	0.45
Directorate of Government Analytical Laboratory	5.34	6.95	8.34	10.00
National Identification and Registration Authority	27.34	35.54	42.65	51.18
Total GOU funding	218.73	253.84	197.12	236.53
Expectation from Development Partners	27.00	31.70	71.00	65.00
Funding under PPP		114.30	114.00	114.00

Figure 12: Fourth Sector Development Plan

5. Conclusion: Stop funding JLOS immediately

This report found 77.889.600 euros of Dutch taxpayer money that was sent to the JLOS sector between 2008 and 2019, a period of 11 years.

During those years, in 2011 and 2014, support was stopped after a corruption scandal and the anti-gay bill. As Arne Doornebal illustrated, the suspension of the 2014 donor cut was not because of EKN concerns, but because of protest here in the Netherlands. After the protests, EKN quickly resumed donor support. This creates the belief that only demand from the Dutch population itself will generate enough pressure to stop funding JLOS.

Although during the years the EKN has tried to focus on technical issues and support-side of governance, which means a focus on civil society, the EKN continues to give vehicles and motorcycles to the Uganda Police. Furthermore, due to the support of EKN to the JLOS, they provide legitimacy to an extremely corrupt institution, under a deadly regime that is unafraid to use force.

While writing this report, following weeks of the Uganda Police obstructing opposition activities in mobilizing for the Ugandan national elections of 2021, both opposition leaders Patrick Oboi Amuriat and Bobi Wine were arrested. In outrage and desperation, civilians protested. The Uganda Police Force reacted in a similar manner as they have been reacting for the past 15 years; with violence.

The website freedomuganda.com, that aims to promote human rights in Uganda, contains material of LDU's shooting at civilians (<https://freedomuganda.com/?p=479>), besides documenting the murder on several bystanders such as this sales lady (<https://freedomuganda.com/?p=487>).

It is of utmost importance, that these findings should be publicized in the media, taken to Dutch parliament, and financial donor support to the Ugandan JLOS sector should be stopped now by the Netherlands government.

The Netherlands, although in the top 5 of influential donors of Uganda (Doornebal 2016), does not stand isolated.

Assistance to Uganda has been constant at an average level of about USD 1.7 billion per year. The bilateral aid amounts to about USD 1 billion per year. Uganda's dependency on official development assistance (ODA) has reduced in recent years from about 50% of the budget a decade ago to about 25% today. ODA remains an important source of financial resources for the Ugandan regime, and the following countries (plus European Union) also provide donor support:

1. European Union
2. Austria
3. Belgium
4. Denmark

5. France
6. Germany
7. Ireland
8. Italy
9. Sweden
10. United Kingdom
11. Iceland
12. Japan
13. Norway
14. South Korea
15. United States

Uganda has a large bilateral and multilateral donor community including the World Bank and the United Nations agencies, USAID, DFID, the EU, including its member states, and Japan as the largest bilateral donors. In addition, there are thousands of international and local non-governmental, private-voluntary and faith-based organizations carrying out development activities at various scales.

A substantial portion of donor support to the JLOS sector goes to the Uganda Police and LDU's, who use extreme violence against peaceful protest. This is hurtful, as for a long period of time, this regime has been conceived as illegitimate by its own population, but through our external legitimacy of donor support, we keep it in power.

By maintaining the status quo of oppression, risks increase of a violent explosion, as youth see no other option than to fight the extreme state oppression back with violence of their own. During the protests in Kampala between 18 and 20 November 2020, the urgency of change was showcased. Another activist Fred Mutibwa (2019) warned about the dangers of maintaining the status quo:

Time is running out

“Uganda is a ticking time bomb. Because of the fast population growth and lack of any prosperity or future prospects of the youth, they can explode into violence after another election is rigged. Even though people do not show it on the street, they have been suffering a lot for many years, building anger in themselves. When they get the opportunity, this anger will lead to destruction. After 2021 elections we will either have freedom or civil war” (Fred 2019).

That election Fred is talking about, will take place on 14 January 2021. It seems, that instead of financing a ‘beacon of stability’, the EKN has financed a situation where the tension of frustration and hopelessness among youth has built up to such extent, that Uganda has the risk for becoming a ‘beacon of instability’. We need to act, before that happens.

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